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Vulnerability analysis of hydrological infrastructure to flooding in coastal
cities - a graph theory approach
Abstract

Hydrological infrastructure such as pumps and floodgates are invaluable assets for mitigating flooding in
coastal cities. These infrastructure components are often vulnerable to damage or failure due to the impact of
flood waters, thus exacerbating the flood hazards and causing significant loss of life and destruction to
property worth billions of dollars. Hence, there is a growing need worldwide to enhance the understanding of
flood vulnerability and to develop key metrics for assessing it. This study proposes an approach for measuring
the vulnerability of hydrological infrastructure to flood damage in coastal cities. In this approach, a
hydrological infrastructure flood vulnerability index (HIFVI) is developed based on exposure, sensitivity and
resilience of infrastructure assets to flooding. A graph-theoretic algorithm for implementing the proposed
HIFVI is presented and applied to assess the flood vulnerability of floodgates in one of the most
representative coastal cities - Jakarta, Indonesia. The application involves the construction of a graph-based
spatio-topological network model of Jakarta's hydrological system, with floodgates represented as network
nodes and waterways as edges. An analysis of the constructed network is carried out based on the underlying
graph-theoretic algorithm to compute HIFVI for all nodes that represent floodgates. The results show that
HIFVI can point to the most vulnerable hydrological infrastructure components and also highlight locations
within coastal cities where additional infrastructure are required to improve resilience to flooding. These
information are vital to decision makers when planning and prioritising infrastructure maintenance and
resource allocation for flood preparedness in coastal cities.
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ABSTRACT Hydrological infrastructure such as pumps and floodgates are invaluable assets for mitigating flooding in coastal cities. These
infrastructure components are often vulnerable to damage or failure due to the impact of flood waters, thus exacerbating the flood hazards
and causing significant loss of life and destruction to property worth billions of dollars. Hence, there is a growing need worldwide to enhance the understanding of flood vulnerability and to develop key metrics for assessing it. This study proposes an approach for measuring
the vulnerability of hydrological infrastructure to flood damage in coastal cities. In this approach, a hydrological infrastructure flood vulnerability index (HIFVI) is developed based on exposure, sensitivity and resilience of infrastructure assets to flooding. A graph-theoretic
algorithm for implementing the proposed HIFVI is presented and applied to assess the flood vulnerability of floodgates in one of the most
representative coastal cities - Jakarta, Indonesia. The application involves the construction of a graph-based spatio-topological network
model of Jakarta’s hydrological system, with floodgates represented as network nodes and waterways as edges. An analysis of the constructed network is carried out based on the underlying graph-theoretic algorithm to compute HIFVI for all nodes that represent floodgates.
The results show that HIFVI can point to the most vulnerable hydrological infrastructure components and also highlight locations within
coastal cities where additional infrastructure are required to improve resilience to flooding. These information are vital to decision makers
when planning and prioritising infrastructure maintenance and resource allocation for flood preparedness in coastal cities.

1

INTRODUCTION

With the increasing frequency and intensity of rainfall and associated floods in coastal cities, there is a
need to judiciously allocate limited resources for routine maintenance and upgrade of existing hydrological infrastructure (e.g. pumping stations, floodgates),
in a manner that improves their resilience and minimises their failure during extreme flooding events
(Sadoff et al. 2013). Ideally, such resource allocations and investment decisions should be effectively
targeted at the most vulnerable components in the
hydrological infrastructure system. By so doing, the
failure of the hydrological infrastructure system and
the resulting loss of life and property damage associated with flood inundation can be minimised (Hall et
al. 2003). Though a quantitative assessment of vulnerability can point decision makers to the most vul-

nerable components in the hydrological infrastructure
network, this is not a straightforward task that lends
itself to a standardised process of finding suitable
metrics (Balica et al. 2012). In the context of coastal
cities situated in developing nations, this task is further complicated by the lack of sufficient data, potentially limiting the range of possible solutions (Brecht
et al. 2012).
To address this issue, this study proposes a graphbased network approach for measuring hydrological
infrastructure flood vulnerability index (HIFVI), using the concepts of exposure, sensitivity and resilience. The graph theory approach provides a rigorous
mathematical basis for computationally reducing
vulnerability to a single metric, using very little
available data within the data-starved environment
and allowing for further improvement from the initial
results as additional data becomes available in the fu-

ture (Bunn et al. 2000). In this approach, a graphtheoretic algorithm for implementing the proposed
HIFVI will be developed and applied to assess and
rank the flood vulnerability of Jakarta’s floodgates,
using the constructed spatio-topological network
model of the city’s hydrological system. The following section establishes the general equation for computing the flood vulnerability index of hydrological
infrastructure components.
2

DERIVATION OF FLOOD VULNERABILITY
INDEX FOR HYDROLOGICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE COMPONENTS

Generally, vulnerability is determined based on three
main factors: exposure, sensitivity (or susceptibility),
and resilience (Balica et al. 2012). This can be represented mathematically using the general flood vulnerability index (FVI) formula (Eq. 1) (Balica et al.
2012).

 =

∗


(1)

The exposure of any given floodgate is determined
by the length of all waterways that flow from upstream towards it (Balica et al. 2012). Given that the
number of waterways that flow from upstream towards a given floodgate can range from 1 to n, the
length, l, for each of these waterways can be summed
to determine the exposure, E, of the floodgate. Mathematically, this can be represented as shown in Eq. 2.

= ∑ 

(2)

Susceptibility is a system characteristic, which determines the degree to which the system is affected
by the impact of flood waters (Balica et al. 2012). In
this study the capacity of the floodgate is used as a
measure of susceptibility to flood damage. During intense flood events, a floodgate with lower capacity is
considered more susceptible to failure or breakdown
as compared to one with a greater capacity. Hence,
given that Cg is the capacity of a given floodgate,
susceptibility, S would decrease as Cg increases. This
relationship can be represented mathematically as
shown in Eq. 3.
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(3)

Resilience can be derived as a function of redundancy (Chang & Shinozuka 2004). In this study, the
resilience of a given floodgate, FG, in the hydrological infrastructure network is determined based on redundancy provided by connected upstream floodgates (Chang & Shinozuka 2004). Factors considered
in measuring the redundancy provided by each connected upstream floodgate include capacity, c, geometric length, l (i.e. distance along flow path(s) to
FG), and the upstream network configuration. The
connected upstream floodgates with higher value of c
and lower value of l contribute more to the resilience
of FG. In terms of upstream network configuration, a
connected upstream floodgate would contribute maximally to the resilience of FG if its location in the
network allows it to divert floodwater from all the
different channels flowing to FG. However, with additional number of channels, w, connecting the link
between the two floodgates, the contribution of the
upstream floodgate to the resilience of FG reduces
accordingly. Hence, given that FG has m number of
connected upstream floodgates, its total resilience, R
can be estimated using Eq. 4.
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 is the structural resilience of the referent floodgate based on the physical property of its material,
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is the total resilience contributed by the

connected upstream floodgates, where i is an element
in the set of connected upstream floodgates, which
may be made up of 0 to m members. 0 member
means that there are no connected upstream floodgates, in which case ∑
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By substituting Eq. 2, 3, and 4 into Eq. 1, a general equation (Eq. 5) is obtained for estimating FVI
(i.e. HIFVI) in the context of hydrological infrastructure (specifically floodgate) for flood mitigation.
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A graph-theoretic algorithm for applying Eq.5 to
compute the HIFVI for the floodgates in a hydrological infrastructure network is shown below.

Begin
V = set of all nodes in the network, G.
A node, v represents either a junction or floodgate.
E = set of all edges in the network, G.
An edge, e is represented as (* *+ ), where * = start node
and *+ = finish node.
- = set of all floodgates in the network, such that - ∈ 
For g such that g ∈ - :
Do
1. Obtain the capacity, /0 of g
(Note: /0 is encoded as an attribute in network nodes).
2. Compute total length of waterways, 10 connected to g.
--2- = 0 (Initialisation)
--Find - , set of all upstream nodes connected to g
-- For e such that e ∈ E:
if (* ∈ - ) and (*+ ∈ - )
2- = 2- + (geometric length, l of e)
--Return the value of 23. Compute 34, the set of floodgates linked to g upstream.
4. Compute the total resilience, 564 contributed by the
upstream floodgates connected to g in four steps:
+ = 0 (Initialisation)
-- For f such that f ∈ Fc:
(i). Compute c, being the capacity of f.
(ii). Compute the total number of additional waterways,
W joining the link between each connected upstream
floodgate and g (i.e. a measure of branchness factor).
W = 1 (Initialisation)
+ = set of all nodes in the shortest path between f
and g.
.
For p such that p ∈ + :
78 = the number of inward edges to p
if 78 > 1 (an indication of branchness)
W = W + 78
Return the value of W
(iii). Compute the total length of waterways, L between f
and g.
L = 0 (Initialisation)
+ = set of all nodes in the shortest path between f
and g.
For e such that e ∈ E:
if (* ∈ + ) and (*+ ∈ + )
L = L + (geometric length, l of e)
Return the value of L
(iv). Compute sum of the resilience contributed by all
upstream floodgates connected to g.

+ = + +
9∗:
5. Compute the total resilience, R of g.
--  = 1 (structural resilience,  is assigned a constant
value of 1 for all floodgates in the network.)
--  =  + +
6. Compute the flood vulnerability index, HIFVI of g.
9
--  = 
 ∗

End
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A CASE STUDY APPLICATION:
JAKARTA’S HYDROLOGICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK

Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia was selected for this
study because it is one of the most exemplary coastal
cities of developing nations that depend heavily on
structural measures or hydrological infrastructure
(e.g. floodgates, pumps, etc.) to mitigate the devastating impact of flooding on the people, property, economy, and environment (Li 2003). As a low-lying delta city served by thirteen rivers, Jakarta relies on a
network of pumping stations and floodgates to control water flowing from surrounding hills and mountains, through the city to the Java Sea (Hartono et al.
2010). The frequent use of these ageing and poorly
maintained hydrological infrastructure components
during the annual monsoonal flooding (between November and March) exposes them to the damaging
impacts of floodwaters, with possibility of breakdown or failure as a consequence (Turpin et al.
2013). Generally, the pumping stations are used to
move out accumulating floodwater, particularly in
low lying areas where drainage is difficult without
pumping (Tingsanchali 2012). On the other hand, the
action of closing a floodgate allows it to be used for
diverting floodwater away from flooded areas located
downstream of the floodgate. Because the acquired
dataset for the pumping stations was incomplete at
the time of this study, this application focuses on just
the floodgates infrastructure in Jakarta.
The floodgate dataset, in addition to Jakarta’s waterways (i.e. rivers, canals, and streams) were acquired and processed in readiness for network construction and subsequent vulnerability analysis. The
data acquisition involved the use of ground survey,
GPS locations and aerial imagery analysis to capture
and record the names and locations of the different
floodgates and waterways in Jakarta. The resulting
waterways vector data is of line geometry type while
the floodgates vector data made up of 30 records is of
point geometry type. Using the topology toolset and
GRASS plugin within the QGIS software, these datasets were processed to remove topological and locational errors introduced during survey and digitisation of mapped data. Furthermore, edges in the
waterways dataset were programmatically split into
separate line features where they self-intersected or

intersected with floodgate infrastructure. This is to
ensure that at the construction of the hydrological infrastructure network, junctions are created were they
actually exist.
The graph-based spatio-topological network model of Jakarta’s hydrological infrastructure was constructed using the PostGIS spatial database schema
and coupled Python interface to the NetworkX graph
analysis package developed by Newcastle University
(Barr et al. 2012). This software was first extended to
support the proposed graph type (i.e. multidigraph),
which permits multiple edges between the same
source and target nodes. Topology was encoded
within the data using a system of unique node and
edge primary keys. In the absence of high resolution
and accurate elevation data to model flow direction
of Jakarta’s waterways, directionality was inferred by
edge orientation assuming the general condition of
water flowing from the mountains of Bogor to the
south of Jakarta, and through the city to the Java Sea
in the north. Where exceptions to this assumption existed based on actual field observations of water flow
in the city of Jakarta, corrective adjustments of edge
orientation were made by re-ordering (i.e. reversing)
the geometric points in the linestrings.
The completed network comprised of 628 edges
representing Jakarta’s waterways, with a total geometric length of 1092 km. There were 560 nodes in
the network, 30 of which represent floodgate infrastructure, and the remaining 464 representing network junctions (e.g. river confluences). Figure 1
highlights the locations of the floodgate infrastructure in the network.
Following the successful construction of the network model, the NetworkX and the Pandas Python
libraries were used in implementing the underlying
graph-theoretic algorithm, resulting in the computation of HIFVI for all 30 floodgate infrastructure in
Jakarta. In this implementation, certain assumptions
were made. For instance, in the absence of relevant
data to determine structural resilience,  this parameter was assumed to be a constant value of 1 for each
floodgate in the network. Similarly, in the absence of
data for floodgate capacity, the number of gates in
each floodgate was used as a proxy for capacity. The
computed HIFVI values were stored in a PostGIS database table and accessible for visualisation using geographical information system software (e.g. QGIS).

Figure 1. Jakarta’s floodgate infrastructure network
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RESULTS

The results of an application of the graph-theoretic
algorithm to Jakarta’s hydrological infrastructure are
index values representing the degree to which each
floodgate in the city is vulnerable to failure or damage due to the impact of flood waters. The index values (i.e. HIFVI) were normalised to give a number
from 0 to 1, where 0 does not mean absence of vulnerability, but rather a representation of the lowest
vulnerability and 1 indicates the highest in this dataset. This approach allows for a comparative assessment of infrastructure vulnerability to flood hazards (Balica et al. 2012).
To further characterise hydrological infrastructure
based on computed HIFVI, index values were classified into 5 different levels of vulnerability as follows:
0-0.2 = very low vulnerability, 0.2-0.4 = low vulnerability, 04-0.6 = moderate vulnerability, 0.6-0.8 =
high vulnerability, and 0.8-1 = very high vulnerability (see Table 1).
The results show that “Sunter C” topped the category of very high vulnerability floodgates, thereby
ranking as the most vulnerable floodgate with computed HIFVI value of 1. On the other hand, “Sunter

Utara” had the lowest computed HIFVI value of 0,
making it the least vulnerable to failure or damage
arising from the impact of flood waters. Overall, Table 1 shows that 10% (i.e. three) of Jakarta’s floodgates were classified as having very high vulnerability to failure or damage due to the impact of flood
waters. Another 3.33% (i.e. one) of the floodgates
was moderately vulnerable, but 0% (i.e. none) was
classified as highly vulnerable based on computed
HIFVI. Most floodgates (i.e. 17) came under the category of very low vulnerability, representing 56.67%
of the entire sampled infrastructure. This is closely
followed by another 30% (i.e. 9) classified as having
low vulnerability to failure or damage due to the impact of flood waters. These results and their implications are discussed further in the subsequent section.

Exposure

Resilience
1.45
1.05
1.00
1.43
1.00
1.39
1.51
1.78
1.13
1.94
1.10
1.50
1.75
1.00
1.00
1.52
1.64
1.26
1.53
1.00
1.00
1.19
1.15
1.64
7.25
1.00
1.00
1.00
63.26
1.00

199.89
133.65
122.59
203.95
164.23
150.31
307.40
169.77
160.47
164.02
163.09
157.59
153.79
101.23
143.50
176.82
170.12
151.23
36.24
33.81
12.81
21.79
19.70
15.94
34.29
3.04
6.84
3.09
150.34
0.92

Ranking

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
0.33
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.33
0.50
0.25
0.33
0.33
0.25
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.13
0.50
0.33
0.50
0.33
0.33
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.17
0.33
0.25
0.25

HIFVI

Sunter C
Ciliwung Lama
Kebon Baru
Muara Angke
Cakung Drainase
Karet 2
Pasar Ikan
Hailai
Istiqlal
Tangki
Jembatan Merah
Kali Cideng
Citra Land
Cengkareng Drain
Pulogadung
Ancol
Pekapuran
8
Sogo
Poglar
Warung Pedok
Manggarai
Setia Budi
Minangkabau
Kampung Gusti
Kalimati
Honda
Duri
Karet
Sunter Utara

Susceptibility
(1/no. of gates)

Name of
floodgate

Table 1: Vulnerability ranking of Jakarta’s floodgate
infrastructure based on computed HIFVI

1.000
0.921
0.890
0.518
0.397
0.391
0.370
0.346
0.343
0.306
0.268
0.253
0.212
0.182
0.172
0.168
0.149
0.108
0.084
0.080
0.045
0.043
0.040
0.034
0.016
0.009
0.007
0.006
0.003
0.000

VH
VH
VH
M
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL

VH= Very High, M = Medium, L = Low, and VL =
Very Low.
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DISCUSSIONS

This study has proposed a new flood vulnerability
index and an underlying graph-theoretic algorithm to
comparatively assess and rank floodgates in coastal
cities based on their exposure, susceptibility, and resilience to flooding. An application of the graphtheoretic algorithm to Jakarta’s hydrological infrastructure produced index values that point to the most
vulnerable floodgates in the network (see Table 1).
“Sunter C” ranked as the most vulnerable floodgate
in Jakarta, followed by “Ciliwung Lama”, and “Kebon Baru” in that order. These three floodgates are
characterised as having very high vulnerability and
they represent the top 10% of Jakarta’s floodgate infrastructure that are most likely to fail during a flood
event. Hence, they should be prioritised during infrastructure maintenance and resource allocation for
flood preparedness. To minimise their vulnerability
to flood damage, limited resources can be judiciously
spent on increasing their capacities by adding extra
gate units where possible. No doubt, this outcome
will be useful to coastal communities and external
funding bodies who often require structured vulnerability assessment techniques that facilitate transparent
and efficient decisions on where the limited resources
allocated for flood mitigation should be invested.
Furthermore, because “Kebon Baru” does not currently have any upstream floodgate connected to it,
its vulnerability can also be further minimised by improving its resilience through the installation of additional upstream floodgates. This way the pressure on
“Kebon Baru” created by accumulating floodwaters
can be controlled using the additional upstream
floodgates, thereby reducing the probability of structural failure due to infrastructure fragility (Turpin et
al. 2013). This demonstrates the usefulness of the
adopted approach in highlighting locations where additional infrastructure may be required.
In addition, this approach to vulnerability assessment can be useful to decision makers who require
justification for vulnerability attribution. For example, “Sunter C” ranked as the most vulnerable floodgate partly because of its huge exposure to 199.89km
length of waterways as compared to very low vulnerability ranking floodgates like “Duri” and “Sunter
Utara”, which are only exposed to 3.09km and
0.92km length of waterways respectively. Another

reason is because of its high susceptibility to flood
damage, which can be attributed to the fact that it only has one gate unit compared to very low vulnerability ranking floodgates like “Sunter Utara”, “Honda”,
and “8” which has 4, 6, and 8 gates respectively.
Similarly, the very low vulnerability of 56.67% of
Jakarta’s floodgates is mainly due to their low exposure to flood waters when compared to other floodgates in the city. However, in the case of “Karet”, it
is its high resilience attained through redundancy
provided by connected upstream floodgates that
makes it rank as a very low vulnerability floodgate.
No doubt, such detail of vulnerability attribution can
leave clues as to what actions can be taken to minimise infrastructure vulnerability.
6

Moreover, the impact of flood waters on the hydrological infrastructure can be more accurately accounted for if additional data such as elevation,
width, depth, roughness, and flow rate of river channels are available.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to acknowledge the support
of this project by the Australian National Data Service (ANDS) through the National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy Program, as well as the
University of Wollongong Global Challenges Program.

CONCLUSION

This paper has proposed a graph-based network approach for measuring hydrological infrastructure
flood vulnerability index (HIFVI), using the concepts
of exposure, sensitivity and resilience. An application
of the proposed method produced HIFVI values for
Jakarta’s floodgates, demonstrating its usefulness in
ranking and comparing the vulnerability of hydrological infrastructure components to flood damage in
coastal cities. The results will facilitate transparent
and efficient targeting of limited resources towards
routine maintenance, future investments and upgrades to the flood control infrastructure within
coastal cities situated in developing nations. Importantly, the method was found to be useful in highlighting locations where additional infrastructure may
be required to improve resilience to flooding. This
will enable coastal cities in developing nations plan
for more resilient future and to improve the outcome
of their structural response to flood hazards.
One limitation of this study is the absence of additional data to improve the quality and reliability of
the technique. This issue can be addressed by taking
advantage of the graph theory feature, which allows
for incremental integration of additional data into the
network model as they become available in the future
(Bunn et al. 2000). Hence, future study will seek to
improve the quality and reliability of the technique
by introducing additional data related to hydrological
infrastructure components (e.g. asset age, flood
height capacity, maintenance and failure history).
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